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Explaining choices in energy infrastructure development as a network of adjacent




•    NAAS concept operationalizes a polycentric perspective on energy infrastructure governance.
•    In the Baltic Sea region, LNG infrastructure fulfills expectations in three issue-areas simultaneously.
•    Not only actors, but also resources, information and rules can link action situations, affecting policy
output.
•    Technological lock-in is more evident at the level of the Baltic region than of individual countries.
Abstract
This paper contributes to the development of a polycentric perspective on energy infrastructure governance
by  developing  the  concept  of  network  of  adjacent  actions  situations  (NAAS).  Examining  the  case  of  LNG
infrastructure development in the Baltic Sea region, it clarifies how choices made in interlinked policy areas
may affect infrastructural policy output in a regional context. It is argued that LNG is expanding as a new
major energy technology around the Baltic due to its capacity to fulfill policy expectations in three issue-
areas: enhancing energy security, providing low-sulphur bunker fuel, and balancing renewables in the power
sector. The analysis of linkages between these actions situations emphasizes the spatial, temporal, and
discursive aspects of energy infrastructure governance at the regional level. The application of NAAS as an








Until 1980s, energy infrastructure provision was typically in the hands of the governments and state-owned
businesses. Shifts in the political economy towards privatization have not only changed infrastructure
ownership, but also management, operations, and decision-making models (Solomon, 2009). While the
energy policy objectives, conditions and instruments of financial procurement are defined at the highest
political level, infrastructure planning has become a deliberative landscape – and sometimes a battlefield -
for a broad array of stakeholders (Wolsink, 2007, Hindmarsh and Matthews, 2008, Ottinger et al., 2014). The
role of multiple actors acting at different levels was highlighted in energy governance literature (for example,
Smith, 2007; Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012; Goldthau, 2014), particularly articulated in energy transition
studies (Verbong and Geels, 2007). Empirical case-studies indicated that temporal and contextual
contingencies pertaining to the variety of decision-making contexts have an effect upon infrastructural policy
choices (Hill and Gaddy, 2003, Collier, 2011). Nevertheless, most previous studies of energy infrastructure
development focused on a single-country policy context (Irwin, 1997, Priemus, 2007, Flyvbjerg et al., 2009,
Marshall, 2012).
The aim of this paper is to clarify how policy choices made in interlinked policy areas may affect
infrastructural policy output in a transboundary regional context. Goldthau (2014) presented theoretical
considerations for polycentric energy infrastructure governance, acknowledging a lack of empirical studies
on this topic. This paper contributes to the development of a polycentric perspective on energy infrastructure
governance by investigating the case of liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure ‘boom’ in the Baltic Sea
region (BSR)1 through the lens of network of adjacent action situations (NAAS) concept. NAAS was introduced
as a part of the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2005) to investigate "how
simultaneously occurring decision processes interact with each other to shape governance and policy
implementation" (McGinnis, 2011, p. 51).
The Baltic Sea region presents a curious case of energy infrastructure development. In 2011, the first Baltic
LNG terminal was opened in Swedish Nynäshamn, providing capacity of 20,000 m3 per annum, most of which
was sourced from the natural gas liquefaction plant in Stavanger (Norway). In 2014–2016, another four LNG
import terminals with cumulative storage capacity of 550 000 m3 were deployed in Finland, Lithuania,
Poland, and Sweden. Moreover, the GIE LNG database projected that by 2020 there will be up to seventeen
import facilities with a total capacity 1,305,400 m3 and an export terminal with a capacity of 10 mln m3 per
year in Ust Luga, Russia (GIE, 2016). This is not a case of technological innovation uptake: LNG technology
has been in regular use in other European regions since 1960s. Moreover, since the negative environmental
and health effects of fossil fuels are well-established and globally alternative energy technology investments
outplace gas (Randall, 2016), large-scale LNG investments at this point in time are puzzling. Given the
circumstances,  how  can  we  explain  why  actors  around  the  Baltic  Sea  commit  to  development  of  LNG
infrastructure as a new major energy technology?
This paper argues that growing interest in LNG infrastructure development in the BSR is explained by the
capability of LNG technology to fulfill policy expectations in addressing three diverse, yet interlinked policy
problems: increase energy security, mitigate air emissions from shipping, and assist sustainable energy
transition. In this way, the article makes a contribution to understanding the complexity of energy
infrastructure governance by highlighting that policy outcomes are influenced not only by actors within a
focal action situation (one policy area and/or one country), but by a combination of functional
interdependencies between different decision-making contexts. The practical contribution of this research is
in showing the relevance of functional interdependencies between adjacent action situation for planning and
governance of energy infrastructure at the regional level.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the analytical framework. Section 3 discusses
methodological choices. Section 4 proceeds to mapping of individual action situation, as well as analyzing the
network interdependencies. Section 5 identifies the contributions of the NAAS framework to the energy
infrastructure analysis. Section 6 points out policy implications and concludes.
2. Analyzing a network of adjacent action situations
Polycentric governance, a concept denoting the co-existence of many decision-making centers within a
common overarching framework (Ostrom et al., 1961), has significant analytical value in energy research
(Cherp et al., 2011, Smith, 2007, Sovacool, 2011), with a relevance in the context of energy infrastructure
(Goldthau, 2014). While polycentric governance has been successfully used as both descriptive and
normative concept (Thiel, 2016), empirical studies have remained limited and largely concentrated on cases
of resource governance. Partially, this can be explained by the lack of frameworks that operationalize
polycentric governance and translate this theoretical construct into a number of variables accessible for
empirical work. To bridge this gap McGinnis (2011) suggested to ‘zoom out' from action situations to a
network of adjacent action situations.
Action situations are settings where two or more actors make choices out of a set of potential actions that
jointly produce outcomes, whereas exogenous variables are assumed constant (Ostrom, 2005). An action
situation is composed of seven components: (1) actors, (2) their positions, (3) set of actions, (4) the potential
outcomes, (5) control, (6) information, and (7) costs and benefits associated with the outcomes (Ostrom,
2011). Since complex institutional systems exhibit a property of polycentricity, analysis of one analytically
separated action situation is unable to grasp the dynamics of policy-making and implementation. As noted
by Ostrom, “in field settings, it is hard to tell where one action situation starts and another stops” (2011, p.
15). Linking action situations appears to be crucial for understanding the dynamics of outcomes in complex
policy settings and operationalizing polycentric governance.
The basic assumption in NAAS analysis is that while each action situation is a decision-making center in its
own right, rules governing an action situation are determined not only endogenously, but also exogenously
– within other (adjacent) action situations. McGinnis proposed two procedures for identifying adjacent action
situations in a complex policy setting: first, on the basis of rules that define the seven components of an
action situation, and second, drawing upon the generic governance tasks (provision, production,
consumption, coordination, dispute resolution, rule-making) (McGinnis, 2011, p.51). In his 2011 article,
McGinnis used the second procedure (generic governance tasks) to illustrate how networks of adjacent
action situations can be analyzed.
Kimmich (2013) extended NAAS application by integrating the ecology of games approach and proposed a
method to empirically capture the adjacency and its effects on the policy process. Villamayor-Tomas et al.
(2015) combined NAAS and the value chain framework to conceptualise interrelations between action
situations as a production chain where outputs from one situation affect the other. Jones et al. (2017) applied
NAAS to understand how processes that occur in parallel across scales and levels affect the future policy
outcomes. However, neither the original nor the subsequent studies explicitly using the NAAS framework
illustrated the first procedure suggested by McGinnis – defining networks of adjacent situations based on the
seven components of the actions situation (McGinnis, 2011, p.51). This paper aims to fill in this gap by
suggesting how NAAS analysis can be conducted on the basis of functional interrelations between the
components of action situations.
McGinnis advocated a broad definition of adjacency: action situations are adjacent if “outcomes generated
in one action situation help determine the rules under which interactions occur within the other action
situation” (McGinnis, 2011, p. 52). Fig. 1 illustrates a network of adjacent action situations A, B and C linked
on the basis of a shared outcome. Outcomes can vary from immaterial (e.g., shared understanding, legal
provisions)  to  physical  (e.g.,  harvest  results,  industrial  output)  (Ostrom,  2011).  If  two  or  more  action
situations share outcomes, they have common scope rules, that is, rules that identify required, desired or
prohibited outcomes, thus, can be considered adjacent. The network of linked action situations reveals the
complexity of policy settings that condition each other.
Figure 1. Linking action situations: Adjacency on the basis of the shared outcome.
Source: Author.
3. Methodology
The analysis of energy infrastructure development as a network of adjacent action situations requires
identifying the actions situations and their adjacency, collecting data pertaining to each of the action
situations, and making explicit the functional interrelations in the network. In this analysis, NAAS is based on
the measurable outcomes of the policy process, meaning, the LNG terminals as shared physical output of
infrastructural policy choices in the BSR. The use of LNG is considered as a viable policy option in three actions
situations: enhancing energy security, promoting sustainable energy transitions, and curbing air pollution
from shipping. These action situations correspond to the three major use cases for LNG: as a form of natural
gas transportation, as a form of natural gas storage, and as an alternative fuel (EU, 2016, MEMO/16/310). In
gas-exporting countries, competitiveness and penetration of new markets is another action situation where
LNG is expected to play a role, for instance, in Russia. Yet, as most BSR countries do not produce and export
gas, this action situation has been considered within the energy security (of demand) issue-area.
Policies aimed at improved energy security, resilience and sustainability of energy systems (e.g., European
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 2009) and minimized shipping pollution (e.g., HELCOM Baltic Sea Action
Plan 2007) were on the Baltic regional agenda for over a decade. It was after 2013, that LNG emerged as a
policy option in the BSR stemming from a combination of factors that were previously absent. First, the
deterioration of EU-Russia political relations since 2014, including the suspension of EU-Russia Energy
Dialogue, created increased interest towards LNG in the Baltic region, where dependence on Russian gas
import was strong (Judge et al., 2016). LNG transport provides an alternative to pipeline gas transport,
thereby allowing importers to diversify the suppliers and play a role in emerging competitive gas market.
Second, the new environmental legislation on shipping sulphur emissions in the Baltic Sea coming into force
on  1.1.2015  raised  LNG  to  the  top  of  agenda  in  the  maritime  industry,  where  its  capability  to  serve  as
alternative bunker fuels were evaluated (Gritsenko and Yliskylä-Peuralahti, 2013). Third, the 2030 EU Energy
Strategy adopted in 2014 created new impetus for Europe-wide energy transition. The use of LNG as natural
gas storage that offers flexibility and proximity to individual and industrial consumers on and off the grid,
offers an alternative to other more polluting fossil fuels by contributing to more sustainable heat and energy
production.  This  property  of  LNG came in  the forefront  in  the Framework Strategy for  a  Resilient  Energy
Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy in 2015 (COM, 2015). Such non-binding strategies, as
well as upcoming binding regulations, contribute to policy change already at the time of initiation as they
have a ‘framing effect’ on the policy agenda (López-Santana, 2006). In addition, as global oil price fell in late
2014, traditionally oil-linked gas prices also declined, making an outlook for LNG-related investment more
attractive.
For the purpose of empirical investigation, the components of the action situations were operationalised in
the following way. An actor is defined as “a single individual or a group functioning as a corporate actor”
(Ostrom, 2011, p.12). A rather seamless web of actors and events in each actions situation can be regarded
at three different levels – constitutional, collective (institutional) or operational (Ostrom, 2005). This study
concentrates on the operational level, that is, day-to-day actors interactions and physical policy outputs.
Position is defined as actor's role in governance interaction, distinguishing between rule-demanders
(beneficiaries), rule-suppliers (regulators), targets of rules (adopters), and rule intermediaries (e.g., experts,
international organizations and agencies) (Büthe, 2010, Abbott et al., 2017). This framework allows for a
systematic approach to identification of positions actors occupy in the action situation and highlights that
positions may change over time and depending on the situation. Actions are choices available to actors who
act in regard to the policy problem – what they may, must, or cannot do in given circumstances. Key question
for analysis is which actions are pursued, announced, desired, rejected, and intended by whom? The
outcome, which is the development of LNG infrastructure, is shared by the three action situations under
scrutiny. The level of control the participants have over choices and the information available to them (as
well as uncertainties) were assumed in accordance with formal rules and public information. Costs and
benefits assigned to the shared outcome were outlined on the basis of estimations provided in the secondary
literature.
The assumptions made in this study with regard to information about and control over the potential
outcomes impose limitations on our analysis. First, while incomplete information and imperfect information-
processing capabilities are built into the model (Ostrom, 2011), information asymmetries cannot be made
explicit. While we assume that incomplete knowledge affects all actors in a similar way, some actors may
exploit information advantages and act opportunistically. To compensate for these shortcoming, the study
pays special attention to the larger policy context in the BSR using media and observations at a number of
policy  events  during  2013-16  (Annex  I).  Second,  actors  are  assumed  to  take  actions  either  on  their  own
initiative or in result of compliance with existing laws and regulations. Yet, much of the interaction is
governed by informal rules that are not written anywhere. These shared meanings emerging within
organizations and issue networks (e.g., expert groups) are difficult to ascertain in empirical research, thus,
our focus is on the locus of formal aggregation (including permissions, agreements, and laws).
Desktop research, field observations and personal communications were used to derive rich data for
reconstructing the individual action situations and ascertaining the interrelationships between the functional
components of the action situations at hand. The data included energy, maritime and sustainability policy
documents from the EU and the Baltic Sea countries, statistical data, media communications from energy
companies, observations and personal communication with stakeholders at key events (Annex I). The
qualitative data was used to extract information about existing and planned LNG terminals (GIE, 2016),
particularly on the actors, their interrelations, and the policy context. Methodologically, the outlined
analytical procedure is in line with methods of qualitative analysis, specifically information extraction based
on topics of interest, pattern recognition, event tracing (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
After mapping out the individual action situations, overlapping and interdependent components were
identified to reveal functional connections between the action situations and explore how functional
connections between the other components of these adjacent action situations prompted LNG infrastructure
'boom' in the BSR. In this way, NAAS analysis is different from network analysis of governance, since network
analysis seeks to establish connections between the actors across different levels of governance (in energy
research, for example, Parag et al., 2013; Maggetti, 2014), whereas NAAS identifies a wide array of functional
connections not limiting the analysis to interpersonal or interorganizational connections. The results focus
on the material and/or institutional parameters that structure one situation and influence components of
the adjacent action situations.
4. Results: LNG infrastructure development in the Baltic Sea region
4.1. Focus on energy security
The first action situation where LNG is considered a viable policy option is energy security. In the definition
of the World Bank, energy security encompasses three aspects: diversification of supply, minimization of
price volatility, and energy efficiency (World Bank Group, 2005). Security of supply usually denotes
uninterrupted supply of energy critical for the functioning of an economy (Kruyt et al., 2009). From the
producers’ perspective, energy security is related to stable demand for their products, as well as access to
primary resources (Sovacool and Brown, 2010). Energy efficiency, in its turn, adds to a holistic perspective on
energy security, in particular in the context of developing economies (Selvakkumaran and Limmeechokchai,
2013). As a result,  the matter of energy security is among the top priorities on the national energy policy
agendas of most countries.
Gas trade governance is a subject of constant tensions between importing and exporting countries. As EU-
Russia attempts to define comprehensive energy trade rules has not been successful, the positions of the EU
member states and Russia are defined broadly by the WTO rules (Prontera, 2017). Hence, the level of decision
making is national or even supranational, which gives actors a high level of control over their choices. For the
European Union (EU), that imports more than half of its energy, in particular oil and gas, the issues of energy
security are pressing. Until recently, four Baltic countries were net gas importers fully dependent on Russian
gas supplies (Table 1).








Denmark 56 4,2 0 35,8 17 DONG (purchase and transmission)
Estonia 0 0 7 7 9 Elering (transmission), import
demonopolized 2013 (Eesti gaas, LITGAS)
Finland 0 0 36,8 36,8 8 Gasum (import and transmission)
Germany 115,8 225,0 436,0 956,0 22 Multiple transmission and import
companies
Latvia 0 0 15 15 28 Latvijas Gāze (import and transmission)
Lithuania 0 0 28 28 31 AB Amber Grid (transmission), ), import
demonopolized 2010 (eight operators)
Poland 49,4 0 102,3 178,5 14 Polish petroleum and gas mining (PGNiG)
(import and transmission)
Sweden 0 1,1 0 12,4 2 Swedegas (transmission), import
demonopolized 2007
EU 28 1699,7 1046,1 1332,3 4996,0 23
Source: Eurogas statistical report 2014. (NB: 1 TWh = 0,0923 bcm)
The recurrent EU-Russia energy crises made the issue of energy dependency particular relevant and the
desire for supply diversification particularly strong (Liuhto, 2013, Judge et al., 2016). In 2014, the EU released
its Energy Security Strategy and prompted all  the Member States to carry out energy security stress tests
(COM(2014) 654 final). The short-term resilience of the European gas system has proven to be particularly
weak in the BSR. The low resilience of the EU gas supply is due to the logistics of natural gas in Europe that is
largely dependent on gas pipelines: 86% of natural gas is imported in the EU through pipelines and only 14%
in  form  of  LNG  (Eurogas,  2014).  Though  gas  pipelines  remain  the  most  cost  efficient  way  of  gas
transportation, they are spatially bound and do not allow flexibility in supply choices. It has been long
recognized that  LNG has  a  potential  to  revolutionize  the future gas  logistics  (Hayes,  2007),  as  it  allows a
greater volume to be stored at smaller facilities with greater flexibility.
The gas market in the BSR is characterized by a large share of state-owned gas companies. In Finland Latvia,
and Poland gas is still operated as a natural monopoly, while Sweden, Lithuania and Estonia demonopolized
their gas markets within the last few years. Gas market liberalization in the Baltic States came hand in hand
with introducing the LNG technology (Pakalkaité, 2016). LNG import terminal development seems favorable
for the eastern Baltic Sea countries, as it allows decreasing energy dependency on single supplier (Russia) by
increasing gas supply diversification. By building capability to import LNG, the gas importing countries will
have an opportunity to create complex multi-supplier portfolios (Rozmarynowska, 2010), including gas
import from Qatar, Malaysia, Algeria and the neighboring LNG producer – Norway (IGU, 2017) (Table 2).
Table 2. TOP-10 LNG producers in 2015
Country Supply to market Market share % of EU LNG supply, 2014
Qatar 77.8 31.8% 47%
Australia 29.4 12% < 0,1%
Malaysia 25 10.2% < 0,1%
Nigeria 20.4 8.3% 10%
Indonesia 16.1 6.6% < 0,1%
Trinidad 12.5 5.1% 7%
Algeria 12.1 5% 26%
Russia 10.9 4.5% < 0,1%
Oman 7.8 3.2% 0.4%
Papua New Guinea 7 2.9% < 0,1%
Sources: IGU, 2016 and Eurogas, 2015. (NB: 1 TWh = 0,0923 bcm)
Russia also seeks benefits from LNG technology that allows shipping gas overseas bypassing the transit
countries. LNG terminal in Kaliningrad aims at avoiding pipeline transit to the Russian enclave currently
running through Belarus and Lithuania, in line with the overall Russian strategy to favor sea transport to land-
based transit (Gritsenko, 2015). Russian gas export that has been controlled by the state monopoly Gazprom
for two decades has been liberalized from 1.1.2014, contributing to stimulation of LNG exports. According to
Russia's Energy Strategy up to 2030, LNG shall not only boost gas export to new markets both geographically
(e.g., in Asia) and functionally (transportation fuel business).
The dominant narrative of energy security lends an explanation why construction of LNG import terminals
and floating storage and (re)gasification units (FSGUs) in Baltic Sea countries is being prioritized by national
governments that secure significant funds to co-finance this infrastructure, in particular by applying for EU
funds (EU, 2016). Lithuania offers an example of how the idea of LNG as a way of leveraging the Russian
‘energopower’ (Tynkkynen, 2016) by commissioning LNG FSGU under the symbolic name Independence that
eventually did not yield commercial viability.
There is strong evidence that oil prices present an important dimension of energy security concerns and can
affect  the  speed  of  energy  infrastructure  deployment  (Csereklyei  et  al.,  2016).  Oil  prices  are  particularly
important for the LNG market due to a large share of oil-linked contracts. The sharp decrease in oil prices in
late 2014 enhanced actors’ expectation of lower priced LNG (IGU, 2017). Coupled with plans to increase LNG
liquefaction capacity in producing countries, and consequently lower prices, this added incentives for
developing new receiving and storage terminals as a measure to diversify the supply portfolio. Yet,
diversification of suppliers does not equate with diversification of energy supply. Renewable energy sources
have been highlighted as a potential source of enhanced energy security by switching from extensive import
to more localized and decentralized production of energy (Valentine, 2011).
Whereas benefits of constructing LNG import infrastructure as a tool for diversification of gas supply are
largely  political,  costs  are  both financial  and environmental.  Financially,  LNG may not  be the best  way to
enhance energy security given the volatility of gas market and steady decrease in price of renewables.
Moreover, environmentally LNG is inferior to alternative energy solutions, thus, in the long run the benefits
offered by LNG proliferation may be significantly reduced, in particular, when carbon taxation instruments
are fully implemented.
4.2. Focus on reduction of shipping air emissions
The second action situation where LNG has gained a status of one of the preferred policy options is reduction
of air pollution from seagoing vessels. In 1997, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted the
Annex VI to the International Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution from ships (MARPOL1973/78).
In accordance with this regulation, progressive reduction of air emissions from ships, including sulphur (SOx),
nitrogen (NOx), particle matter (PM) and measures to improve energy efficiency were introduced. Five
geographic areas, which with regard to European waters are currently limited to the Baltic Sea, the English
Channel and the North Sea, have been designated as Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECA), which set a
maximum 0.1% sulphur for all ship operations in SECAs from 2015, comparing to the global cap of 3.0%.
The EU has also expressed its concerns about the impact of transport on air quality and adopted the EU
sulphur directive (2012/33/EU) that enforced the IMO regulation, aiming at ensuring a substantial reduction
of SOx in ship exhaust to the benefit of coastal communities and the marine environment. Apart from public
regulators, an important role in the process of sulphur emission reduction in the BSR is played by ports,
equipment manufacturers and other parties that are directly involved in creating conditions that enable the
adoption of new technologies (Gritsenko and Yliskylä-Peuralahti, 2013). Baltic Ports Organization has played
a crucial role by initiating two LNG in Baltic Ports projects co-financed by the EU in the TEN-T framework,
which produced design, planning, and technical knowledge through assessment and feasibility studies.
Finally, some of the companies operating in the Baltic Sea decided to take a first move: Viking Grace, the
world's first passenger ferry running on LNG, has had its maiden voyage in January 2013.
Ship-owners operating in the SECA areas were offered several compliance options in order to meet the SECA
regulation, including use of low-sulphur fuel (MDO/MGO); use of exhaust gas cleaning systems (scrubber);
and use of LNG (EMSA, 2010). The benefit of LNG as a bunker fuel is a significant reduction of sulphur (SOx),
nitrogen (NOx) and particle matter (PM) emissions in ship exhaust it allows in comparison to other options
(Table 3). In addition, the promise of LNG bunkering was instigated by projections of a future global average
LNG base price of $10–15/mmBTU in 2015. The expectation of reduced compliance cost (in comparison to
oil-derived fuels) and the interest of suppliers to create new markets for natural gas are strong drivers for
LNG penetration in shipping (IGU, 2017).
Table 3. Comparison of shipping emission reduction options
NOx SOx CO2 PM
Scrubber ±0 -97% ±0 -40 … 65%
LNG -85% -99% -20% -95%
MDO/MGO ±0 -70… 85% ±0 -55 … 70%
Source: own compilation from Corbett and Winebrake, 2008; Wik and Niemi, 2016.
Yet, LNG is not the only available alternative to oil-based marine fuels. Methanol, which allows emission
reduction at the rate of LNG (almost complete elimination of SOx and PM, 60% less NOx and humble 25%
reduction  of  CO2),  is  especially  attractive  in  the  light  of  carbon  capture  and  storage  (CCS)  technology
adoption that enables conversion of CO2 into methanol, as well as easier storage and distribution (Winnes
et al., 2015). In the BSR, methanol bunkering has been tested by Swedish shop owner Stena Line. Another
option is the use of non-fossil shipping biofuels, which are also biodegradable and thus less harmful for
marine environment. They can be produced from local materials, including waste, thereby contributing to
circular economy and reducing lifecycle emissions (Yliskylä-Peuralahti, 2016). Biogas can be converted into
liquefied biogas and used as a marine fuel, i.a. in combination with fossil fuels, but the deployment of this
technology is at the trial stage. Wind, solar, and nuclear propulsion, though technically possible options, are
not currently considered as viable alternatives in shipping. After all, it is LNG bunkering that has eventually
taken hold in the BSR as LNG infrastructure is being set up.
Unlike in the case of developing LNG infrastructure as means to diversify the security of supply, where control
over the decision-making process is at the highest political level, uptake of LNG as an alternative marine fuel
is often referred to as a ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem. Ship owners are not willing to retrofit their vessels as
long as the bunkering infrastructure is absent, whereas ports and energy companies are reluctant to invest
large capital into building up the LNG infrastructure as long as there are no users. Initially, LNG did not have
an infrastructural advantage in comparison to methanol or biofuels - all of them required setting up extensive
new infrastructure. That is why interventions of public actors have been important: the European
Commission called for development of LNG bunkering facilities in European ports by 2025, prioritizing 139
EU seaports  by  2020 as  part  of  the TEN-T projects  (COM(2013)  17,  Faber  et  al.,  2010).  Support  has  been
granted by committing funding to ensure availability of LNG for maritime use on a core network of European
ports as a part of 5.85 bln EUR Connecting Europe Facility plan available for trans-European energy
infrastructure projects (EU, n/d).
In addition to the ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem, ship owners are acting under the informational uncertainties
related to the cost of infrastructure development and vessel retrofitting, safety perception, and economic
and regulatory aspects of LNG bunkering. Though the LNG industry enjoys a better safety record than many
other segments of the energy sector (Licari and Weimer, 2011), confidence in LNG as a bunker fuel has not
yet been developed due to a lack of precedent. Large ports are often located in proximity of densely
populated areas and construction of LNG terminals may provoke skeptical and rejecting attitudes within local
population (Licari and Weimer, 2011).2
When it comes to cost projections, LNG ‘naked commodity’ price as a benchmark for LNG bunker can be
somewhat misleading as intermediaries are required between large LNG import terminals and bunkering
vessels/stations (Bourgeois, 2014). The price of LNG that ‘enters’ a terminal and of that ‘entering’ an LNG-
fueled vessel differs due to logistical cost. The regulatory uncertainties are expected to improve with the
recent adoption by the IMO of the International Code of Safety for Ships using Gases or other Low-flashpoint
Fuels (IGF Code) that provides mandatory provisions for the arrangement, installation, control and
monitoring of machinery, equipment and systems using low-flashpoint fuels, among others LNG.
While LNG has often been proclaimed the ‘marine bunker of the future’ in various BSR stakeholder events,
the uptake has been slow. The early adopters, however, may gain significant advantage and positive image
effects over the latecomers. Even though to date the effect of LNG facilities development on port competition
in the Baltic Sea ports cannot be empirically proven, changes may be expected once a critical amount of
vessels have switched to LNG. Baltic ports may need to adopt a more proactive position and try to acquire
LNG infrastructure at an early stage of LNG maritime applications development as the absence or presence
of bunkering facilities may affect their competitiveness in the near future (Gritsenko and Serry, 2015). Finally,
it should be kept in mind that LNG is still a fossil fuel and does not represent a sustainable long-term solution.
In addition, slow transition to LNG bunkering may provoke modal shift from sea to land (Holmgren et al.,
2014), which would result in reduced pollution from ships, but increased pollution and congestion on the
roads. In sum, the major benefit stemming from adoption of LNG is the reduction of air pollution from ships
and competitive advantage for early adopters. Yet, we may ask whether the costly long-term infrastructural
investment into another fossil fuel is the best available option to reduce air emissions from shipping in the
long run (Yliskylä-Peuralahti, 2016).
4.3. Focus on energy transition
The third action situation is energy transition, defined as a shift from a system dominated by fossil-based
energy towards a system using a majority of renewable energy sources, also increasing energy efficiency and
improving energy demand management (Geels, 2002). In the BSR, energy transition is among the key topics
discussed in regional policy events. All countries, including Russia, have in place public finance schemes that
support adoption of renewable energy, have adopted national energy efficiency strategies, and in some
countries such plans are also available at the regional level. Much of these efforts are directed towards public
sector, building, and improved efficiency of energy infrastructure. In the private sector, energy-intensive
industries seek ways of improving their energy balance as means of cost-saving. For example in Scandinavia,
LNG has replaced oil products in a variety of industries and is used for combined heat and power production
(heating, drying, or cooking of products), and as a raw material in the manufacture of hydrogen (Skangas,
2017). Finally, energy transition is a business opportunity for equipment manufacturers and energy providers
in the renewable and bioenergy segments. Thus, the policy arena of energy transition is populated with a
variety of stakeholders who have interest in LNG technology.
The frameworks for energy transition in the BSR were taken to the highest political level. The EU does not
have exclusive competence in the field of energy, so Member States have the right to determine their own
energy mix within the framework of the EU's sustainability and climate policy. Non-EU states have full control
over  their  means of  meeting the climate commitments  of  their  national  strategies  and the Paris  Climate
agreement 2015, to which all BSR countries are signatories. Currently, the use of renewables and the future
strategies vary among the countries in the Baltic Sea region. Table 4 indicates, that in all countries of the BSR,
gross inland energy consumption of renewable energy has been increasing, and for some EU countries it even
exceeds inland renewables production (Table 5). Apart from Germany that pursued policies aimed at increase
in solar and wind power generation (Energiewende), the BSR countries do not benefit from solar energy,
while wind energy occupies a significant share only in Denmark.















Denmark 18101 -0,96 24,2 30 3 331 -3,46 4378 5,56
Estonia 6703 2,24 12,7 25 555 -4,46 851 4,72
Finland 33926 -0,22 29,2 38 2 860 -2,83 9919 2,58
Germany 324272 -0,66 10,3 18 72
885
-0,81 33397 8,64
Latvia 4466 -0,35 36,1 40 1 205 -1,49 1611 1,1
Lithuania 6687 -3,25 18,1 23 2 165 -1,67 1212 4,07
Poland 98159 0,78 8,7 15 13
727
1,45 8559 8,41
Sweden 49134 -0,46 34,8 49 963 1,05 17083 1,79
Russia** 747400 20 3 4,5 4134
600
0,5 2800 2,6
Source: Eurostat, IEA IRENA database and EIA report 2014.
Gross inland consumption is calculated as follows: primary production + recovered products + total
imports + variations of stocks - total exports - bunkers.
* average annual growth rate 06>13;
** For Russia, data is for 2012, growth notifies % in 2012 to 2002. RES 2020 goal includes only
electricity generation. Gas = 459,4 bln m3.











Wind, % Main support scheme
Denmark 3240 2,1 68,1 0,2 0 29,5 feed-in tariff
Estonia 1222 0 95,7 0 0,2 4,1 feed-in premium
Finland 9934 0 88,2 0 11,1 0,7 feed-in premium
Germany 33680 9,6 70,8 0,4 5,9 13,2 feed-in tariff & auction
Latvia 2137 0 87,8 0 11,7 0,5 feed-in tariff
Lithuania 1288 0,3 92,1 0,1 3,5 4 feed-in tariff
Poland 8512 0,2 91,1 0,2 2,5 6,1 power auctions
Sweden 16770 0,1 63,4 0 31,5 5 green certificate
scheme
Russia** 1331800 0 0,6 0,1 1,1 0 capacity auction
Source: Eurostat, IEA IRENA database, and IEA report 2014.
** Data for Russia for 2012.
Whereas a need for change towards a more sustainable energy system has been acknowledged in all BSR
countries and at the regional level by the Baltic Sea Energy Co-operation (BASREC), the set of potential actions
is widely debated. Renewable sources of energy, such as solar, wind, hydropower, and alternative fuels,
ultimate the picture. Among the questions that remain unsolved are the extent of and timescale when the
use of fossil fuels shall remain acceptable. Moreover, the position of nuclear energy remains ambiguous. As
a result, most of contemporary conversations on energy transition in the BSR are speculations about what
will constitute a sustainable future energy mix, with LNG as an inherent part thereof.
LNG has been branded as the 'cleanest fossil fuel' (IGU, 2016). The idea of LNG as an intermediary step to
enable energy transition is promoted by think-tanks and consultancies (see, for example, Alhashemi, 2016).
The International Energy Agency estimated that LNG will play a key role in helping the shift towards a lower
carbon economy and meeting world's energy needs during the transition to renewable energy. Some
scientific studies also argued for the uptake of LNG as a ‘bridging’ technology (Van Foreest, 2010, Weijermars
et  al.,  2011,  Park  et  al.,  2013).  Germany,  where  the  policy  strategy  of  nuclear  exit  called  Energiewende
presupposes  reduction of  GHG by 80% and increase of  renewables  share in  energy mix  by  60% by 2050
(Matschoss, 2013), provides an example. The German Energy Agency (DENA) promotes LNG as a clean
transport fuel to support the ambitions Energiewende program (Siegemund et al., 2014). The increased
pressure to phase out coal in Europe through the broader adoption of a carbon price creates favorable
conditions for the gas-fired power sector (IGU, 2017). In addition, LNG is considered as a way of dealing with
renewable energy's intermittency and storage challenges.
The main role for the public actors in this process is securing conditions in which LNG infrastructure
(transport, storage, (re)gasification) can be developed. Backed by the EU funds and other public finance,
plans for LNG infrastructure in the BSR assume construction of large import terminals, as well as smaller
terminals for local LNG distribution. A growing number of medium- and small-scale LNG facilities is driven by
expansion of LNG end-use markets (Jankowski et al., 2014). The use of LNG as a marine fuel of the future
discussed in the Section 4.2 fits within this larger trend. Demand by a large number of users (including
road/inland navigation, local industries, power generation) is seen as a crucial incentive to supply LNG to
ships for any large import terminal. Moss et al. (2015) conducted a study of ‘ownership’ of the German energy
transition and observed a mixture of top-down and bottom-up initiatives, as well as demonstrated how shift
to renewables informed the idea of regaining control of energy at the local level. Similarly in the BSR, despite
the push for energy transition coming from the highest political level, the policies related to energy transition
affect and challenge local actors, necessitating their involvement and response.
Investment into building up a comprehensive LNG infrastructure is costly, but it may pay off in the mid-term
for the early adopters as they will have a competitive advantage once LNG use will become a common place
in local industries (Acciaro et al., 2014, Songhurst, 2014). Besides emission reduction, among the benefits of
including LNG into the future energy mix they name diversifying and adding resilience to the energy system.
Yet, a comprehensive assessment of cost and benefits stemming from uptake of LNG as a ‘bridging’ energy
technology shall take an account of lifecycle emissions of LNG, which include up-, mid-, downstream and
fugitive emissions. No studies proposing assessment models have been identified. Moreover, the optimal
future energy mix is an open question as it depends not only on the current, but also on the new technologies
and their comparative cost-efficiency.
4.4. Analyzing network configuration
Table 6 aggregates information about the components of the three adjacent action situations where LNG is
presented as a policy option that can alternate the status quo. LNG infrastructure is the shared physical
outcome – and a solution to a policy problem - in three action situations: energy security, clean shipping, and
energy transition. Also other components of the action situations overlap and these linkages realize in form
of synergies that affect the pay-off calculations.
Table 6. Network of adjacent action situation in uptake and proliferation of LNG
infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region.
Rule type Component Energy security Clean shipping Energy transition
Boundary Actors Nation states, EU,
energy companies.
IMO, EU, ship owners,
ports, energy companies.























Aggregation Control Highest political level “Chicken-and-egg” Mixture of top-down and
bottom-up initiatives





















In terms of actors, we observe that the nation states are the core decision-making actors when it comes to
energy policy and choices regarding the future energy mix, while in the shipping action situation international
organizations (the IMO and the EU) are central actors to prompt LNG as a bunker fuel through regulatory
measures. The EU also secured significant funds for Baltic EU ports development, including LNG
infrastructure. Local industry actors, including ship owners, are dependent in their choice of energy/fuel
options on availability of infrastructure and cost comparison of different options. The nation states, within
the EU and independently, are dependent in their capacity to implement energy transition initiatives, as
actors at the local level, both public and private, have a significant control over technological developments.
This is very different in the energy security situation, where states are not mere regulators of private activity,
but rather active promoters of LNG infrastructure that is seen as a way to diversify both suppliers and
customers, and a bargaining chip in the regional energy politics. Energy companies are involved in all action
situation, as they are strategically pursuing the development, construction and operation of LNG terminals
acting as the primary investors into the new infrastructure, often at transnational level.
There are different actions available in each action situation that could solve the core problem of the
situation. In order to ensure energy security, energy importing countries can reduce their dependency on a
single supplier by diversifying their energy portfolio through uptake of LNG or by increasing the share of
inland renewable energy production. In order to address air emission from shipping, ship owners can use
different types of fuels, including low-sulphur fuels, LNG, methanol, biofuels, or install a scrubber. In order
to enable transition of the energy system to low-carbon, energy users can increase energy efficiency, increase
the use of renewable energy sources, accept nuclear energy or use LNG as a ‘bridging’ solution to substitute
other more polluting fossil fuels. In fact, the options in the three action situations are not completely mutually
exclusive; future energy mix will most probably be based on a combination of LNG and renewable energy
sources. Yet, LNG appears to be the option that can fulfill policy expectations in all three action situations in
the immediate future. Thus, while LNG may be considered inferior to other options within a single action
situation, the outcome can be better understood when considered within a network of adjacent situations.
The role of expert assessments and feasibility studies can be highlighted in all three situations. Future
assessments play an important role in structuring the field of possible actions and legitimizing policy choices
(Anderson, 2010), also in relation to natural gas, where private consultants “become partly responsible for
new energy development on a local and global scale” (Mason, 2007, p. 368). The flow of information from
one policy situation to another becomes apparent from the policy documents: for instance, Finnish and
Estonian energy strategies make explicit linkages between multiple use options of LNG. While the individual
action situations are prone to incomplete information, network membership allows actors easier access to
information and lowers the efforts necessary for persuasion, consequently lowering transaction costs. The
government-funded pilot projects and sustainability experiments in facilitating the diffusion of uptake of new
energy and environmentally-related technologies, highlighted in the literature on technological innovation
(see for example Raven, 2007 and Hendry et al., 2010), complement and illustrate expert assessments.
Finally, it appears that the cost/benefit component has shared cost (infrastructure investment), while
offering different benefits in different situations. The fact that a number of problems can be addressed
through one investment seems attractive to the investors, since the development of energy infrastructure is
costly, and LNG is no exception. The cost of an LNG terminal construction ranges from 45 to 55 mln USD for
a small-scale facility to up to 10 bln USD for a large-scale multi-functional plant and an LNG-carrier vessel
costs about 200 mln USD. In the BSR, the EU has been the major investor into infrastructural projects since
the EU Eastern Enlargement, state contributions through guaranteed loans have also been typical (Kuznetsov
and Olenchenko, 2013). The initial push is coming from the EU and its member states willing to diversify their
energy supplies, and by choosing LNG technology this goal aligns with the growing pressure to decarbonize
energy systems. LNG is now seen as a ‘bridging’ technology to increase adoption of renewables, which, in its
turn, will also contribute to energy security. Eventually, as LNG facilities start to appear along the Baltic coast,
it becomes more viable for ship owners to consider LNG as a viable option for complying with tightening
environmental regulation for shipping.
5. Discussion
Network of adjacent action situation concept was proposed by McGinnis (2011) to advance the diagnostic
capacity of scholarly investigations relying on IAD framework. NAAS recognizes the dynamic and networked
nature of action situations and suggests that in order to understand an outcome in a certain action situation
we often need to take into consideration adjacent actions situations that may influence this outcome. The
relations captured by NAAS concept are simultaneously multi-level, as two-level games explaining the vertical
entanglements between national and international policy-making (Putnam, 1988), and polycentric,
highlighting horizontal connections between policy arenas, similar also to ecology of games framework (Long,
1958; later adapted by Lubell,  2013). NAAS analysis allows us not only to recognize the linkages between
action situations, but also to assess the factors that affect the development of linkages and outcomes. In
what follows, I will highlight the contributions of a polycentric approach to the analysis infrastructure
governance that emerged from the empirical analysis, with relevance beyond the BSR case, specifically, the
scalar, discursive, and temporal aspects of infrastructure policy choices.
Scale is a persistent topic of infrastructure policy research (see for example, Priemus et al.,  2008). Energy
infrastructure has a strong local component, including embeddedness of physical installations into concrete
landscape, while individual installations “easily scale up to complex regional infra-structure systems”
(Goldthau, 2014, p. 136). In case of LNG infrastructure, one single terminal can have an impact on the local
actors, but a system of terminals has a potential to enhance the overall  resilience of the regional energy
systems, thereby contributing to public policy goals of energy security and short-term CO2 reduction. The
case of shipping emissions reduction illustrates the benefits of looking at infrastructure policy from a larger
scale particularly well. A ship owner would want to be able to bunker their ship at any port, thus, fuel
availability is paramount to propulsion technology choice and port choice. NAAS framework makes us
sensitive to the question of scale: examining one policy arena in a single country provides a different idea of
what is going on than examining three policy arenas at the regional scale.
Secondly, the flow of information between the action situations emphasizes the role of both expert
assessments and pilot projects in policy framing (for an overview on framing in energy policy see Scrase and
Ockwell, 2010). NAAS emphasizes that not only actors, but also other elements of action situations may be
overlapping and interdependent, so that resources, information and rules transcend the given action
situation, and affect the outcomes in adjacent situations. The framing of LNG as a ‘bridging’ solution and ‘the
cleanest fossil fuel’ makes it seem as a silver bullet in all analyzed action situations, thereby creating a
stronger case for developing LNG infrastructure. At the same time, expanding use of LNG is at odds with the
strategy to decarbonize the economy through increased use of renewable energy adopted by all the EU
countries. Stephenson et al. (2012) argue that the transition fuel argument for natural gas is unsubstantiated
by the best available evidence and amounts to ‘greenwashing’. The availability of alternative options in all
action situations (such as, renewable and alternative sources of energy) shall be evaluated, instead, the
possibility to use LNG for multiple purposes is advertised as one of its key benefits.
Finally, the temporal aspect of infrastructure highlights how path dependency is preserved (for instance, as
a ‘technological lock in’, see Unruh, 2000). As return on investment for large infrastructure projects, such as
LNG terminals, is estimated at around 20–30 years, the actors within existing energy power structures
possess strong interest in keeping them operational for a longer term even in the presence of alternative,
more environmental-friendly technologies. The ‘bridging’ technology argument strongly used in maritime
and energy transition contexts reinforces the energy independence argument used in energy security
context, even though it had initially no importance in that context. Even though the rapidly decreasing price
of renewables may yield gas as a ‘bridging’ technology obsolete, extensive LNG infrastructure can legitimize
the use of natural gas and prolong the use of fossil fuels, by committing actors to technical lock-in of energy
infrastructure that is incompatible with the long-term climate change mitigation strategies.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
It was suggested in the introduction to this article that two contributions would be made. One has been to
apply network of adjacent action situations (NAAS) as a conceptual approach that helps to explain the
readiness of states and energy companies to invest in building up significant LNG infrastructure in the BSR
within a relatively short period of time. The evidence here suggests that a possibility to fulfill policy
expectations simultaneously within three issue-areas (energy security, mitigation of air emissions from
shipping and energy transition) reinforced the optimism with regard to constructing LNG infrastructure.
Consideration of the multiple overlapping elements and actors’ ability to draw upon resources and
information that transcends the boundaries of a single action situation has been important to understand
the functioning of adjacent action situations as a network.
The second contribution to energy policy research is rather practical and concerns with the policy
implications. The analysis demonstrates how LNG being an attractive cross-sectoral solution can affect actors’
capacity to respond to future policy challenges by bringing inertia and draining the available resources. While
at the national level, an LNG terminal can indeed diversify the energy mix and enhance supply security, a
system of terminals emerging at the regional scale bears potential for creating a ‘technological lock-in’ that
will commit the region to continued use of fossil fuels due to the existence of path dependent infrastructure.
The ‘stubborn’ nature of costly LNG infrastructure may delay, rather than accelerate, decarbonisation of the
regional economy. Moreover, it may be burdening the state budgets in case an overcapacity will be created
at the regional level. The EU and energy companies are the key promoters – and key investors – into the
Baltic LNG infrastructure development. The perception of spreading the cost of technology uptake among all
the future potential beneficiaries is complemented by safeguarding the demand for LNG technology in the
future in order to prolong the acceptable payback time. Yet, in case of future supply-demand imbalance,
which is not something unheard of in volatile hydrocarbon markets, heavily co-financed through public
investment LNG projects may become unprofitable and weigh on state budgets due to sheer scope of the
physical infrastructure.
Summing up, NAAS provides a diagnostic tool to identify the relevance of interdependencies between
adjacent action situations for planning and governance of energy systems. The observation that actions
occurring in one action situation may influence adjacent situations poses questions regarding the ‘points of
policy intervention’ (McGinnis, 2011, p. 73). The procedure of identifying and specifying which elements of
the adjacent action situations overlap, which actors and in which positions dominate these situations, as well
as how rules, resources, and information transcend the boundaries of action situations to blend arguments
endogenous to a policy setting with new arguments that initially were outside its scope. The use of this
procedure for decision support can help identifying the unintended consequences of infrastructural choices
that are made within a network of adjacent action situations.
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